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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 16, 2018, Le Dinh Luong (Luong) was put on trial in Vietnam 
and sentenced to twenty years in prison under charges of subversion in viola-
tion of Article 79 of the 1999 Penal Code.1 A veteran and Catholic activist, 
Luong had publicly criticized Formosa Ha Tinh Steel, the Taiwanese corpo-
ration responsible for dumping toxic waste into the ocean, which caused a 
major marine environmental disaster off Vietnam’s central coast in 2016,2 as 
well as the lack of an adequate response from the Vietnamese government.3 
He had been targeted by authorities and was taken into custody in July 2017. 
It was not until early July 2018, after almost a year of detention without a 
family visit, that Luong was granted permission to be represented by a defense 
lawyer for his trial scheduled a month later.4 The trial lasted one day with the 
judgment based entirely on the testimony of two witnesses for the govern-
ment, neither of whom were “fit to testify.”5 One of the witnesses later came 
forward to recant his testimony, claiming that he was beaten into making the 
forced confession.6 However, the court still upheld Luong’s prison sentence.7 
Luong was only one of many journalists and activists who were prosecuted 
for peaceful protesting or merely criticizing the Vietnamese government. Vi-
etnam is a one-party state ruled by the Communist Party of Vietnam (Dang 
Cong San Vietnam, CPV). According to Human Rights Watch, many basic 
rights, including freedom of speech and the press, are restricted.8 The state 
controls all print and broadcast media, and authorities have actively and 
 
 1 Vietnam: Drop Charges Against Environmental Activist, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(July 26, 2018), http://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/26/vietnam-drop-charges-against-envi 
ronmental-activist [hereinafter HRW Luong]; Vietnam Sentences Activist to 20 Years 
Prison Amid Dissent Crackdown, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2018), https://uk.reuters.com/article/ 
uk-vietnam-dissident/vietnam-sentences-activist-to-20-years-prison-amid-dissent-crackdo 
wn-idUKKBN1L10RD. 
 2 HRW Luong, supra note 1. 
 3 Vietnamese Bloggers Gets 20-Year Jail Sentence, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS 
(Aug. 16, 2018), http://rsf.org/en/news/vietnamese-blogger-gets-20-year-jail-sentence. 
 4 The Procuracy granted Luong permission in early July and the trial was scheduled on 
July 30. See HRW Luong, supra note 1. 
 5 Richard Finney, Vietnamese Activist Given 20-Year Term for Seeking Regime “Over-
throw”, RADIO FREE ASIA (Aug. 16, 2018), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/overt 
hrow-08162018144518.html. 
 6 Vietnamese Videographer Beaten and Harassed in Prison, COMM. TO PROTECT 
JOURNALISTS (Aug. 20, 2018), http://cpj.org/2018/08/vietnamese-videographer-beaten-and 
-harassed-in-pri.php. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Vietnam, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/asia/vietnam (last visited Oct. 
12, 2018). 
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increasingly silenced journalists and bloggers through arrest, prosecution, and 
other means of harassment.9 
Article 25 of the Vietnamese Constitution states that citizens “shall enjoy 
the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, of access to 
information, to assemble, [freedom to] form associations and [freedom to] 
hold demonstrations. The practice of these rights shall be provided by the 
law.”10 When prosecuting individuals in spite of this constitutional provision, 
the government often masks the charges under “flagrant offense” to go around 
the Constitution, which requires a decision by a court or prosecutor to arrest 
any individual.11 This approach provides the government with vast authority 
to arrest and detain persons “for significant periods of time under vague na-
tional security provisions of the penal code”12 without judicial process. 
Freedom of speech protection is often taken for granted in many Western 
countries, for it is always associated with democracy. It is perplexing then, 
that a non-democratic country like Vietnam would include this protection in 
the law. A scholar has come up with three possible explanations: freedom of 
speech assists with “enforcing central authority,” “alleviates pressures for po-
litical change[s],” and “lend[s] legitimacy to a government.”13 Considering 
the structure of the Vietnamese government and the treatment of peaceful pro-
testors, the explanations seem eerily accurate. 
This Note argues that Vietnam needs a more effective system of enforcing 
freedom of speech protection given the frequent arrests of activists and blog-
gers for peaceful protesting and the insufficient remedies available. This is a 
long-standing issue that has affected Vietnam in many other ways. However, 
implementation efforts may be futile or resisted because the root of the issue 
lies at the structure of the government, which is under heavy influence by the 
 
 9 A month after Tuoi Tre Online, a local news website in Hanoi, published an article 
titled “Vietnamese President agrees on issuing Demonstration Law,” Vietnamese authori-
ties suspended the newspaper for publishing what they deemed “untrue” content. Vo Hai, 
Major Online Newspaper Suspended for Three Months in Vietnam, VN EXPRESS INT’L 
(July 17, 2018), http://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/major-online-newspaper-suspended-for- 
three-months-in-vietnam-3778939.html. 
 10 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 25, translated in 
THE CONSTITUTE PROJECT, http://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Socialist_Republ 
ic_of_Vietnam_2013.pdf?lang=en (Version: As Amended in 2013 - English). The same 
provision was codified under chapter V of the 2001 version. See HIEN PHAP VIETNAM 
(2011) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. V, art. 69, translated in WORLD BANK GRP., https://pu 
blicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Vietn 
am_Constitution_1992_amended%202001_EN.pdf (Version: As Amended in 2001 - Eng-
lish). 
 11 See HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 20. 
 12 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VIETNAM 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 6 (2017), https://www.ju 
stice.gov/eoir/page/file/1057101/download [hereinafter U.S. STATE REPORT]. 
 13 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Free Speech Without Democracy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59, 60 
(2015). 
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CPV. Part II of the Note will provide a brief historical background of Vietnam 
and an overview of the CPV and the structure of the government to illustrate 
this influence. Then Part II will then look at some case studies involving 
peaceful protests, as well as the government’s reactions and its treatment of 
detained protestors. Finally, Part II will conclude by discussing the legal back-
ground and the legitimacy of the arrests. 
Part III will identify possible remedies available for the protestors after 
they are detained. In particular, Part III will analyze whether or not the reme-
dies are adequate or effective. Part IV of the Note will discuss the global im-
pact of the lack of effective freedom of speech protection in Vietnam and the 
international responses considering that Vietnam is a member of the United 
Nations. Part V will advance proposals for certain changes and implementa-
tions, based on the legal structure in Vietnam and the global pressure, in order 
to better safeguard and enforce freedom of speech protection. Ultimately, the 
Note will conclude that, because of the rigidity of the government and the 
CPV’s pervasive influence, many of these measures will be ineffective or im-
possible to implement. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Historical Background and the Government’s Structure 
 
Vietnam declared its independence on September 2, 1945,14 but the French 
were still seeking to re-establish their control of the country. Following World 
War II, French troops landed in Saigon under the pretense of helping the Brit-
ish “disarm the Japanese,” while in fact, two years later, instigating a war that 
lasted until 1954.15 After fighting off the French, Vietnam had to carry out 
another war against the United States until 1975.16 At the heart of the conflict 
during the Vietnam War, or as it is called in Vietnam the “War Against the 
Americans to Save the Nation” (Chiến Tranh Chống Mỹ Cứu Nước),17 was 
North Vietnam’s desire “to unify the entire country under a single communist 
regime modeled after those of the Soviet Union and China.”18 By the end of 
 
 14 Anh Luu, Vietnam Legal Research, GLOBALEX (July 2006), http://www.nyulawglobal 
.org/globalex/Vietnam.html. 
 15 Andrew L. Odell & Marlene F. Castillo, Vietnam in a Nutshell: A Historical, Political 
and Commercial Overview, 21 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 82, 83–84 (2008). 
 16 Id. at 83. 
 17 Tim Nash, Vietnam War Summary, FINER TIMES (Nov. 2, 2008), https://www.thefinert 
imes.com/summery-of-vietnam-war. 
 18 Ronald H. Spector, Vietnam War, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Vi 
etnam-War (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). The Geneva Accord in 1954 temporarily divided 
the country into two parts with separate administrations, pending an election scheduled in 
1956: the northern part is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the southern part is the 
Republic of Vietnam. See Claude Rohwer, Progress and Problems in Vietnam’s 
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the war in 1975, the north prevailed and the unified country was later renamed 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.19 
To understand the reasons for the peaceful protests and arrests of the ac-
tivists, it is necessary to look at Vietnamese government and political struc-
ture. As the name suggests, Vietnam has a socialist regime and is one of the 
few remaining countries where the Communist Party is dominant.20 The Con-
stitution states that the CPV “is the leading force of the State and society.”21 
While only a political organization and not part of the State’s institution, the 
CPV has a central role in the government as well as in the social and legal 
system in Vietnam.22 It has a close relation to the government and influences 
the government through the “election . . . of the National Assembly (Quốc hội 
similar to Congress in the U.S.), the operation of the administration, and the 
function of the judicial system.”23 On a day-to-day basis, the Political Bureau 
(Politburo) and the Central Committee of the CPV exert their influence by 
proposing legislation and regulations.24 Then, every five years, the Party holds 
a national congress to “outline the country’s overall direction and future 
course as well as to formalize policies.”25 
Under Article 69 of the Constitution, the National Assembly, a 498-mem-
ber committee,26 is the highest state organization and possesses a wide range 
of constitutional and legislative powers.27 “The Supreme People’s Court, [the 
Supreme People’s Procuracy], and the Government are all on equal constitu-
tional footing just below the National Assembly,”28 which has authority to 
monitor these institutions29 as well as to appoint their heads.30 The National 
Committee and the Standing Committee (which is empowered to act on behalf 
of the Assembly) are constitutionally the most important bodies in the gov-
ernment, and both operate on the principle of “democratic centralism.”31 This 
principle limits the debates and decision-making within the bounds 
 
Development of Commercial Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 275, 276 (1997); see also Luu, 
supra note 14. 
 19 Luu, supra note 14. 
 20 Odell & Castillo, supra note 15, at 85. 
 21 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. I, art. 4. 
 22 Luu, supra note 14. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Brian J.M. Quinn, Legal Reform and Its Context in Vietnam, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 
219, 225 (2002). 
 25 Government Structure, EMBASSY OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET., http://vietnam 
embassy-usa.org/vietnam/politics/government-structure (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
 26 Id. 
 27 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. V, art. 69. 
 28 Quinn, supra note 24, at 226. 
 29 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. V, art. 70, cl. 2. 
 30 Id. at cl. 7. 
 31 HPVN (2001) ch. I, art. 6. The language is removed in the 2013 amendment. See HIEN 
PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. I, art. 6. 
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established at the central level, effectively prohibiting matters not on the 
agenda.32 Under this regime “all questions before the National Assembly must 
originate from the Standing Committee” which receives its direction from the 
Politburo.33 This system “guarantees that the [CPV] can maintain firm control 
over the agenda [and policy setting].”34 
The judicial branch is similarly under heavy influence from the CPV. First 
off, judges are appointed and subject to a five-year term, same as the National 
Assembly,35 and the requirements “remain to protect ‘socialist legality’ and 
‘the socialist regime’ (by nodding in the direction of prevailing Party policies) 
and to answer to political bodies.”36 Phung Van Tuu, Vice-Chairman of the 
National Assembly, publicly advocated for CPV’s leadership over judicial 
agencies in policy making, trial, and the assignment of cadres, and he stated 
that judicial independence “[did] not mean the separation from the Party’s 
leadership.”37 As a result, judges are very sensitive towards the possibility of 
reacquiring their positions, and in particular, “‘uncooperative’ judges can find 
themselves without an appointment at the end of their five-year term.”38 In 
addition, the judges need to petition for reappointment to the Judge Selection 
Council, which is comprised of representatives from various government de-
partments.39 This setup incentivizes judges to “[lobby] among [members] 
from other organizations . . . for their reappointment”40 and likely cater to the 
government opinion in cases of political interest. Given the role of the CPV, 
the government places a high priority in protecting the Party’s image. As 
shown in the section below, any actions or statements criticizing the Party or 
the government’s conduct are often met with harsh punishment, such as de-
tention, arrest, or long-term imprisonment. 
 
B. Case Studies: Arbitrary Arrests of Peaceful Protestors 
 
In response to the perceived corruption of the government and many injus-
tices, a large number of citizens have engaged in peaceful protesting and 
demonstrations. Nguyen Huu Vinh (also known as Anh Ba Sàm), after leaving 
 
 32 Quinn, supra note 24, at 226 n.14. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 226. 
 35 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII, art. 105, cl. 1. 
 36 PER BERGLING, LEGAL REFORM AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE THE VIETNAMESE 
EXPERIENCE 140 (Umea Universitet 1999). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Quinn, supra note 24, at 240. 
 39 Dinh Thanh Phuong & Nguyen Thi Hang Diem Mi, Revised Law on Courts: Why 
Term of Office of Judges Should Be Extended, VIET. L. & LEGAL F. (Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/revised-law-on-courts-why-term-of-office-of-judges-shoul 
d-be-extended-3971.html [hereinafter Revised Law on Courts]. 
 40 Id. 
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the police force in the Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi, started writing 
several blogs regarding social, political, economic, and cultural issues in Vi-
etnam.41 He was detained in May 2014, held in prison throughout 2015, then 
put on trial in March 2016 for “abusing rights to freedom and democracy to 
infringe upon the interests of the state.”42 He was then sentenced to five years 
in prison.43 The judge held that the articles that he had written presented a 
pessimistic view and negatively affected people’s confidence in the CPV, 
which “[went] against the interests of the nation.”44 Similarly, Nguyen Ngoc 
Nhu Quynh, a blogger under the pen name “Mother Mushroom” (Mẹ Nấm), 
was arrested on similar charges.45 She wrote on social and political issues, 
including land confiscation and investigation on deaths of suspects in police 
custody, and she had participated in numerous public protests regarding the 
environment and human rights.46 
The U.S. State Department reported that in 2017, the government arrested 
for peaceful protesting some “30 individuals . . . includ[ing] members of the 
pro-democracy group[s] . . . , and those involved in expressing dissent or or-
ganizing demonstrations related to the 2016 industrial spill by the Taiwanese-
owned Formosa Ha Tinh Steel[.]”47 For instance, in a footage of the fishermen 
march to file a lawsuit against the Formosa, activist Hoang Duc Binh narrated 
that the fishermen were stopped and beaten by authorities.48 He was arrested, 
and at trial, denied committing any crime because what he said was true.49 
The court, however, deemed the comments “untrue” and slanderous toward 
authorities and sentenced the activist to fourteen years in prison.50 As men-
tioned above, activist Le Dinh Luong was also arrested for his involvement in 
similar protests and was given a twenty-year sentence. 
The best-case scenario for a detained journalist is the revocation of press 
credentials and fines for publishing harmful materials to national interests if 
 
 41 Editorial Board, Free Speech Is Under Siege in Vietnam, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/free-speech-under-siege-in-vietnam/2016/04/2 
1/76ee3c94-fb5a-11e5-9140-e61d062438bb_story.html?. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Vietnam: Drop Charges Against “Mother Mushroom”, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 
30, 2017), http://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/30/vietnam-drop-charges-against-mother-m 
ushroom [hereinafter HRW Mother Mushroom]. 
 46 Id.; see also CPJ Awardee “Mother Mushroom” Faces Threats, Poor Prison Condi-
tions, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (July 3, 2018), http://cpj.org/2018/07/cpj-awardee- 
mother-mushroom-faces-threats-poor-pri.php. 
 47 U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6. 
 48 Vietnam Jails Environmental Blogger for 14 Years, VOA NEWS (Feb. 6, 2018), http:// 
www.voanews.com/a/vietnam-jails-activist-for-livestreaming-pollution-march/4240930.h 
tml. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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such violations “are not serious enough for criminal proceedings.”51 More of-
ten than not, the protestors are merely bloggers and activists, and what awaits 
them is a short, unfair trial following a lengthy period of detention without 
any contact or representation by counsel. Case in point, lawyer Nguyen Van 
Dai, founder of Brotherhood for Democracy, a group aiming to defend human 
rights and promote democracy in Vietnam, was arrested in December 2015 
for producing anti-state propaganda.52 It was not until December 2017 that he 
was assigned an attorney, who was not one his family had chosen, and in fact, 
the three lawyers selected by his family “had not been permitted to meet with 
Dai during his twenty-four months of pretrial detention.”53 
Worse yet, some do not even make it to the court room. Nguyen Huu Tan, 
a Hoa Hao Buddhist follower charged with distributing anti-state documents, 
died while in police custody.54 The authorities, after a questionable investiga-
tion, announced that he committed suicide, even with evidence that indicated 
otherwise.55 In another incident, land rights activist Trần Thị Thúy continued 
to be denied medical treatment for her tumor and open wound “unless she 
‘confess[ed]’ to the crimes for which she was convicted.”56 
Given the dire state of the arrests and subsequent treatment of detainees, 
several important questions arise. First, were those arrests legitimate? Put an-
other way, did the government have a valid legal basis to imprison the activ-
ists? Next, how can a detainee navigate the court system? How the courts work 
and what remedies are available is information not often readily accessible, 
and even when it is a discrepancy exists between the “law on paper” and the 
“law in reality.”57 The legal system in Vietnam allows all three branches (leg-
islature, judiciary, executive) to produce legislation, predictably engendering 
“the inherent problem of a jungle of regulations, which is both inconsistent 
and fragmented.”58 Furthermore, when faced with unfamiliar cases, instead of 
trying to construe the language of the statutes, judges often defer to and seek 
 
 51 U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 18. 
 52 Nguyen Van Dai: Vietnam Jails Activist Lawyer and Five Others, BBC (Apr. 5, 2018), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43659830. 
 53 U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 10. 
 54 Joshua Lipes, Family of Vietnam Hoa Hao Buddhist Questions Death in Custody 
Ruled Suicide, RADIO FREE ASIA (May 4, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/ 
suicide-05042017153429.html. 
 55 See id. (raising doubts based on the extent of the injuries, the blurry CCTV video, and 
the prison uniform). 
 56 Urgent Action: Growing Health Fears for Prisoner of Conscience, AI Index ASA 
41/5727/2017 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA4157 
272017ENGLISH.pdf [hereinafter Urgent Action]. 
 57 Quinn, supra note 24, at 222. 
 58 Bui Thi Bich Lien, Legal Interpretation and the Vietnamese Version of the Rule of 
Law, 6 NAT’L TAIWAN UNIV. L. REV. 321, 326 (2011), http://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/ntulawre 
view/articles/6-1/11-Article-Bui%20Thi%20Bich%20Lien_p321-337.pdf. 
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an informal opinion from the government.59 Such an interpretation is unrelia-
ble when the government has “an obvious stake in the outcome.”60 The vague 
language used in the law on paper, coupled with the courts’ deference to the 
government, has left great discretion to the local officials and other enforce-
ment agencies. 
 
C. Legal Background and the Legitimacy of the Arrests 
 
Before discussing the legitimacy of the arrests, it is helpful to first look at 
the Constitution of Vietnam. Throughout history, Vietnam has changed and 
adopted four versions of its constitution in 1946, 1959, 1980, and 1992.61 
Since then, any revisions have been incorporated directly into the constitution, 
with the latest being the 2013 amendments. On the surface, the revision pro-
cess seemed inclusive with the creation of a Constitutional Drafting Commit-
tee, which gathered millions of citizens’ comments on the first draft and held 
public gatherings and discussions.62 The result, however, largely reflected a 
disregard for the public voice and instead reinforced the role of the CPV.63 
The freedom of speech protection is listed in Chapter II of the constitution, 
which enumerates the citizens’ fundamental rights.64 Under Article 25, citi-
zens are entitled to “the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of 
the press, . . . [and t]he practice of these rights shall be provided by the law.”65 
The basic premise is substantively the same as in the previous revision. None-
theless, it is interesting to note two major modifications. First, this protection 
was put under Chapter V, titled “Basic Rights and Obligations of Citizens” in 
the 2001 amendment, whereas the entire section was moved to Chapter II, 
which was renamed “Human Rights and Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and 
Duties” in the 2013 amendment.66 This change suggests the government’s 
recognition of the inherent nature of these rights as applicable to everyone 
present in the country, not just exclusive to Vietnamese people with valid cit-
izenship status. It also suggests placing a stronger emphasis on establishing 
 
 59 Quinn, supra note 24, at 240. 
 60 Id. at 240–41. 
 61 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], pmbl. 
 62 Rodion Ebbighausen, Vietnam’s New Constitution Shows Limits of Reform, DW 
NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.dw.com/en/vietnams-new-constitution-shows-limits-of-r 
eform/a-17344033. 
 63 Compare HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2001) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], art IV (stating that 
only the CPV is the vanguard of the working class), with HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) 
[HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], art. IV (adding “simultaneously the vanguard of labourers and 
of the Vietnamese nation”). 
 64 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 25. 
 65 Id. 
 66 HPVN (2001) ch. V, art. 69; HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], 
ch. II, art. 25. 
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legal protection. This argument is bolstered by the distinct uses of “citizens,” 
“all citizens,” “everyone,” “no one,” as contrasted with “Vietnamese citi-
zen[s].”67 The second major change was the implementation of Article 14, 
clause 2, which expressly restricts human rights and citizen’s rights “in im-
perative circumstances for the reasons of national defense, national security, 
social order and security, social morality and community well-being.”68 Since 
there is no qualification in scope such as “subject to” or “limited to” a certain 
provision, this Article has a broad application to all other Articles, essentially 
giving the authorities the ability to override the constitutional guarantees of 
human rights when the situation fits the exception.69 
There are two immediate issues. First, on what basis will the circumstances 
be evaluated as “imperative”70 for the purpose of this Article, given the broad 
range of possible violations? Second, what is the process if the circumstances 
are determined to be “imperative”?71 For the first issue, an average person 
may be able to perceive the threshold over which conduct would impose upon 
national security and national defense. In fact, most everyday acts or speeches 
are not likely to pose such a threat. However, in the presence of vague terms 
such as “social morality” and “community well-being” it becomes problem-
atic to safeguard against a possible arbitrary standard. As professor Quynh Thi 
Nhu Nguyen has pointed out, Vietnamese value systems are affected by five 
main values layers,72 and even the government is “confused and trapped with 
vast issues such as what, how and why particular values should be pro-
moted.”73 There is also little guidance from the legislature. Unlike in many 
other countries such as the United States, where the Constitution only enu-
merates a small number of provisions to set a foundation, the Vietnamese 
Constitution has over one hundred articles attempting to address all issues, 
inevitably creating confusion in applying the law. Moreover, Vietnam is a 
civil law jurisdiction and the doctrine of precedents has not been accepted.74 
Court opinions are very short and not written in detail and not publicly pub-
lished, which makes it hard to “follow the legal reasoning that prevailed in the 
judgment.”75 
 
 67 See HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 15–17, 19–20. 
 68 Id. at ch. II, art. 14, cl. 2. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Quynh Thi Nhu Nguyen, The Vietnamese Values System: A Blend of Oriental, West-
ern and Socialist Values, 9 INT’L EDUC. STUD. 32, 34 (2016). 
 73 Id. at 32. 
 74 Andrea Anderson, Judicial Independence and the Vietnamese Courts 35 (Mar. 2012) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Lund University), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=dow 
nloadFile&recordOId=2760334&fileOId=3129618. 
 75 Id. 
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With the likelihood that the constitutional protection for freedom of speech 
may be easily curtailed, the second issue regarding the process arises. Article 
20 of the constitution requires a decision by the People’s Court or a decision 
or sanction of the People’s Procuracy (equivalent to a warrant) before an arrest 
can be made.76 However, as is the case in other articles, the constitution also 
allows an exception here whereby a decision by the court or procuracy office 
is waived if the alleged wrongdoing is a “flagrant offense.”77 Again, the law 
fails to provide any guidance or instruction as to what kind of conduct would 
amount to a flagrant offense and instead leaves the interpretation of the terms 
entirely up to the police who have the discretion to make a snap judgment at 
the scene.78 Possibly to avoid potential contest regarding charges that might 
seem less serious to qualify as “flagrant,” the government often resorts to 
Chapter XI of the Vietnam Penal Code, which provides for crimes of “infring-
ing upon national security.”79 In particular, the accusations are likely under 
Article 79 for activities “aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration” 
or Article 88 for “propaganda against the [state].”80 Both of these charges 
carry severe prison punishment, but require little particularized factual allega-
tions.81 Either of these two Articles is used in tandem with, or often subse-
quent to, charges under Article 258 of the Penal Code for “[a]busing demo-
cratic freedom to infringe upon the interests of the state.”82 This upgrade in 
charges could subject a convicted individual to an additional seven years in 
prison, since a judgment under Article 79 or 88 would guarantee that the of-
fense satisfies the “serious circumstances” test in Article 258.83 
 
 76 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 20, cl. 2. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See infra discussion in pt. III on contesting the legitimacy of arrests. 
 79 LUAT HINH SU VIETNAM [PEN. C.], No. 15/1999/QH10, ch. XI, translated in WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.: VIET., http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/vn/vn/vn01 
7en.pdf (Version: 1999 – English). 
 80 Those found guilty of carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the People’s ad-
ministration are sentenced to at least twelve years in prison, in some cases even life impris-
onment or death. See id. at art. 79, cl. 1. Those convicted of conducting propaganda against 
the state could be sentenced up to twelve years in prison, or up to twenty years in “partic-
ularly serious crimes.” See id. at art. 8, 80. 
 81 A twenty-four-year-old student was arrested and charged with propaganda against the 
state merely for posting anti-corruption blogs aimed at government leaders. See Richard 
Finney, Vietnamese Blogger Phan Kim Khanh Given Six-Year Prison Term, RADIO FREE 
ASIA (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/blogger-10252017154340. 
html. 
 82 PEN. C., ch. XX, art. 258; see Joshua Lipes, Vietnam Jails Activist Blogger for Seven 
Years Over Formosa Protests, RADIO FREE ASIA (Nov. 27, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/engli 
sh/news/vietnam/blogger-11272017160528.html (describing that the activist blogger was 
initially arrested under Article 258 of the Penal Code, but the charges were later upgraded 
to the more severe Article 88). 
 83 See PEN. C., ch. XX, art. 258, cl. 2 (increasing the prison sentence to between two and 
seven years in serious circumstances). 
814 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:803 
The laws of Vietnam provide protection for freedom of speech and at the 
same time create various tools to pierce that protection. They describe the 
process and procedure for arresting a suspected wrongdoer and simultane-
ously include provisions to dispense with the warrant requirements. The ar-
rests of the peaceful protestors are constitutionally permissible, yet suscepti-
ble to abuse. The vague language used, coupled with virtually no guidance in 
legal interpretation, has allowed the police and the government at large, wide 
latitude to construe the law to serve their needs. What results is the legal pro-
tection for the government’s action at the expense of the people. 
III. ANALYSIS: ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES 
This part of the Note will attempt to answer the critical question of whether 
the currently available remedies for protestors who have been arrested and 
detained are adequate or effective. The analysis will start with contesting the 
legitimacy of the arrests to the Prosecutor’s office and to the courts. Then, this 
part will examine the court system, the trials, the roles of judges and jurors, 
and the influence of the CPV on the effectiveness of trials.   
The first remedy is prosecutor review of the arrests. The terms of the con-
stitution grant the Supreme People’s Procuracy of Vietnam (Viện kiểm sát 
nhân dân tối cao, a national-level public prosecutor’s office) authority to re-
view actions taken by the police force,84 including allegations of abuse. In 
essence, the Procuracy acts as a check to the police’s power in case of im-
proper arrest and is fully authorized to order the release of the detainee. For 
instance, the police could make an arrest in urgent circumstances, such as 
when a person almost committed a crime or was in the process of conducting 
the act, and the Procuracy has twelve hours to issue a decision whether or not 
to approve such arrest.85 Additionally, a decision to initiate a formal criminal 
investigation must be issued within three days of the arrest, with the possibil-
ity of extending to six days in total, otherwise the police must release the sus-
pect immediately.86 In theory, this power check is effective because it works 
to discourage police from skipping steps in the process, risking a reversal de-
cision from the People’s Procuracy, and potential criminal liability.87 
 
 84 See HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII, art. 107, cl. 3 (pre-
scribing the responsibility of the People’s Procuracy as including the protection of human 
rights, citizen’s rights, and “ensuring that laws are strictly and uniformly observed.”). 
 85 See LUAT TO TUNG HINH SU VIETNAM [C. CRIM. PRO.], No. 19/2003QH11, art. 86–
87, translated in THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), http://www.oecd. 
org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/46817432.pdf (Version: As Amended in 2003 – 
English). 
 86 Id. at art. 87 (“[T]he custody decision issuers may extend the custody time limit but 
for no more than three days.”). 
 87 See PEN. C., ch. XIII, art. 123 (subjecting those who make illegal arrests to warning, 
non-custodial reform, or even imprisonment of up to two years). 
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However, in reality police operate with little transparency and “sometimes act 
with impunity.”88 The vague language problem in the Constitution and Penal 
Code gives the People’s Procuracy no reliable basis to evaluate the arrest, 
which in turn effectively rids the detainee of another layer of protection. Fur-
thermore, even though Articles 119 and 120 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
limit the time for criminal investigation and temporary detention to two 
months for lesser offenses, they allow four months for “especially serious of-
fenses,” with the possibility of extending to four months for three more 
times.89 Authorities have routinely requested extensions with the purpose of 
punishing and pressuring the protestors to confess to the crimes.90 This effec-
tively translates, for a peaceful protestor who has been charged under Penal 
Code Article 79 or 88,91 to pretrial detention of up to sixteen months pending 
investigation.92 In fact, this period could even be longer if a protestor has been 
charged with multiple violations since the Code does not preclude the plausi-
ble interpretation that such time limit applies to each charge separately.93 
The second remedy comes in the form of judicial review, but contesting 
the basis of an arrest or lengthy detention before a court is also futile. While 
the law provides a detainee the right to counsel from the time of their deten-
tion,94 in practice authorities could use bureaucratic tactics to delay such ac-
cess, many times until shortly before the case goes to trial, leaving the counsel 
inadequate time to prepare.95 Under most circumstances, the detainees are re-
sponsible for obtaining their own attorney, except in the case of minors or 
people with mental disabilities,96 and for paying all legal costs.97 The problem 
is exacerbated because once at trial, it is likely that the only issue argued is 
the criminality of the detainee’s conduct, not the legality of the government’s 
action.98 Since the defense attorney does not challenge the government’s ac-
tion, possibly due to lack of time and preparation, among other reasons, the 
 
 88 U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 7. 
 89 C. CRIM. PRO., art. 119, cl. 2; art.120, cl. 2. 
 90 See Urgent Action, supra note 56. 
 91 Article 79 proscribes activities that are aimed at overthrowing the People’s admin-
istration and Article 88 prohibits activities that constitute propaganda against the state. PEN. 
C., art. 79, 88. These allegations are likely bound up in “especially serious offense” cate-
gory. 
 92 The language in both articles—“the investigation time limit may be extended three 
times, for no more than four months each”—afford twelve more months in addition to the 
original four months. See C. CRIM. PRO., art. 119–20. 
 93 This is a possible explanation, as the State Department has reported that individuals 
could be detained pending investigation for up to twenty-four months. U.S. STATE REPORT, 
supra note 12, at 8. 
 94 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 31, cl. 4. 
 95 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 96 C. CRIM. PRO., ch. IV, art. 57. 
 97 Id. at ch. VII, art. 99. 
 98 See Anderson, supra note 74. 
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damages afforded by the Constitution for arrest and detention “in violation of 
the law”99 fail to serve their function. The detainee’s ability to challenge the 
lawfulness of the arrest or detention before a court, which extends to the abil-
ity to seek compensation from such injustice, is hampered by the govern-
ment’s maneuvers that are not prohibited by law. Thus, once again, the incon-
sistency of Vietnamese law manifests itself: a constitutional protection and 
remedy is readily available on paper but illusory in practice. 
Since contesting the legitimacy of an arrest is not a feasible option, the 
detained protestors could seek remedies at trial. Like many countries, Vietnam 
also recognizes the right to a fair and public trial.100 A judge panel (the bench) 
is set up for each trial, consisting of one judge and two people’s jurors (also 
called people’s assessors),101 who are constitutionally required to assess the 
case independently from each other “and shall only obey the law.”102 The 
unique feature of the Vietnamese trial system is that when considering a case, 
judges and jurors are “equal in [the] right to inquire, argue and vote in public,” 
and this three-member bench renders decisions “by [the] majority of votes.”103 
On its face, this system is democratic. After all, judges are appointed public 
servants, and jurors, who are designated by the People’s Council,104 are the 
representatives of the lay people. Majority rule has also been well established 
as a fundamental principle of democracy.105 Nonetheless, in reality, the sys-
tem does not work as intended. The people’s jurors lack adequate legal train-
ing to perform their roles of “assist[ing] judges to reach a decision that re-
flect[s] the will of the people.”106 In common law jurisdictions, jurors are often 
referred to as “factfinders” or “triers of fact” in a jury trial because they hear 
testimonies and make a ruling on factual issues.107 Only the judges answer 
questions of law.108 Therefore, jurors can be selected from a pool of lay peo-
ple, none of whom is required to have any legal knowledge. In contrast, the 
people’s jurors in the Vietnamese legal system must make a determination on 
both questions of facts and questions of law, under the dual requirements of 
 
 99 The constitution provides that any person who has been arrested, held in custody, or 
sent to jail in violation of the law shall be entitled to damages for injuries to his or her 
person and reputation. HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 
31, cl. 5. 
 100 Id. at ch. VIII, art. 103. 
 101 Nguyen Nien, The Principle of Trial Independence in Vietnam Court, ASEAN LAW 
ASS’N, http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/docs/w1_vietnam.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 
2018). 
 102 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII, art. 103. 
 103 Nguyen, supra note 101. 
 104 Id. at 1. 
 105 Majority Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 106 Penelope Nicholson, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: The Vietnam Court 
Experience, 3 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 37, 43 (2001). 
 107 Fact-Finder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 108 Trial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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“independence” and “abidance by law only,” set forth in the Constitution.109 
Given this higher demand of responsibilities, the Standing Committee of Na-
tional Assembly has established the standards for selection of the people’s 
jurors in the 2002 Ordinance on Judges and Jurors (The Ordinance), which 
require “Vietnamese citizens, who are loyal to the Fatherland and the Consti-
tution . . . have good moral qualities, are incorrupt and honest, have legal 
knowledge, have the spirit to resolutely protect the socialist legal system, res-
olutely protect the interest of the State, the legitimate rights and interests of 
citizens . . . .”110 The Ordinance merely mentions “legal knowledge” without 
specifying any particular qualifications such as a bachelor degree in law or 
training in the field, which are prerequisites for a judge.111 In fact, the people’s 
jurors “do not have to be law graduates”112 or have to show any pertinent legal 
training. There is no transparent assessment for possession of legal 
knowledge, and this potential “lack of skills has been the subject of debate in 
Vietnam, with some lawyers calling for the abolition of the assessors.”113 
Moreover, even judges are not always in the best position to answer or 
explain questions of law. First, there are still concerns regarding the suffi-
ciency of the judges’ education and training. While the Ordinance indeed lists 
more stringent requirements for selection of judges, including a law degree, 
practical work experience,114 and endorsement by the Judge Selection Com-
mittee,115 these criteria are not applied consistently, if at all. As legal teachings 
only gained prominence in 1979, there is a shortage of qualified law graduates 
“clamoring to be judges,”116 which in turn has forced the State to “relax its 
requirements.”117 Specifically, following the passage of the 2002 Ordinance, 
 
 109 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII, art. 103, cl. 2; see 
Tran Duy Binh, The Principle of Independence and Abidance by Law During Trial, VIET. 
L. & LEGAL FOR. (June 29, 2012), http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/the-principle-of-indepen 
dence-and-abidance-by-law-during-trial-3999.html. 
 110 PHÁP LỆNH VỀ THẨM PHÁN VÀ HỘI THẨM TOÀ ÁN NHÂN DÂN [ORDINANCE ON JUDGES 
AND JURORS OF THE PEOPLE’S COURTS], No. 02/2002/PL-UBTVQH11, art. 5 cl. 2, trans-
lated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE NORMATIVE LEGAL DOCUMENTS, http://moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/l 
ists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=9858 (Version: As Amended in 
2002) [hereinafter ORDINANCE]. 
 111 Id. at art. 5. 
 112 Nicholson, supra note 106, at 44. 
 113 Id. 
 114 ORDINANCE, supra note 110, at art. 5. 
 115 Nicholson, supra note 106, at 43. 
 116 Id. at 44. Another consequence following this shortage of qualified judges is the “re-
luctance on the part of the Vietnamese lawmakers to draft laws that leave any discretion to 
the courts.” Rohwer, supra note 18, at 280. 
 117 Penelope Nicholson & Nguyen Hung Quang, The Vietnamese Judiciary: The Politics 
of Appointment and Promotion, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 9 (2005), https://digital.law.w 
ashington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/659/14PacRimLPolyJ001.pdf?sequen 
ce=1&isAllowed=y [hereinafter Nicholson, Politics of Appointment]. 
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the Standing Committee passed Resolution No. 131, explaining that although 
the law degree requirement “should be mandatory,” it would be “some time 
before this ideal can be met.”118 Thus, many judges, classified as “owing a 
‘legal knowledge debt’ (no kien thuc phap ly),”119 typically have only acquired 
certificates in law and continued to receive training, which “occurs once [they 
have] been appointed.”120 To repay this “debt,” the judges take classes offered 
by licensed attorneys, inherently creating a conflict of interest when such law-
yers appear before them in court.121 Second, as discussed above, when faced 
with a novel or uncertain issue, judges often defer to the government for in-
terpretation on questions of law.122 In cases in which the government has a 
stake, such as the arrests and detention of protestors, this approach effectively 
skews the outcome in favor of the government. 
Finally, both the judges and the jurors are under immense influence from 
the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), a political organization created under 
the constitution, and from the CPV by extension.123 Since the selection re-
quirements for judges and jurors include “good moral qualities” and “spirit to 
resolutely protect the socialist legal system,”124 the VFF, which “represents 
and protects [the] legal and legitimate rights . . . of the people,”125 takes up the 
responsibilities of vetting the candidates. The people’s jurors for the Supreme 
People’s Court are appointed by the Standing Committee based on recom-
mendations from the VFF, while those for District and provincial levels are 
appointed by “the local equivalent of people’s council that act on the recom-
mendation of the [VFF] at the local level.”126 For judges, the Party influence 
is structured implicitly within the appointment process, as discussed above.127 
In addition, the traditional endorsement by the Party used to come in the form 
of “an ‘opinion letter from the Communist Party cell’ (y kien cua cap uy).”128 
While the law no longer expressly demands such endorsement, the courts nev-
ertheless continue to seek those letters as a form of “assurance” so that the 
 
 118 Id. (emphasis added). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Nicholson, supra note 106, at 44. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See Bui, supra note 58, at 330–31. 
 123 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. I, art. 9; See also LUAT 
2015 MAT TRAN TO QUOC VIETNAM [THE 2015 LAW ON THE VIETNAM FATHERLAND 
FRONT], No. 75/2015/QH13, art. 1, translated in VIET. LAW & LEGAL FORUM, http://vietna 
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that the Vietnam Fatherland Front was founded and led by the Communist Party of Vi-
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Front. 
 124 ORDINANCE, supra note 110, at art. 5. 
 125 HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. I, art. 9. 
 126 Nicholson, supra note 106, at 43. 
 127 See supra discussion in pt. II immediately preceding sec. B. 
 128 Nicholson, Politics of Appointment, supra note 117, at 14 (footnote omitted). 
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“Party oversight over judicial appointments remains intact.”129 As a result, it 
is rare for non-Party members to become judges. In fact, around ninety percent 
of the judges are CPV members, owing responsibilities to the party “above 
any duty to the development of the law.”130 A Vietnamese attorney has said 
that the independence principle promulgated by the constitution “do[es] not 
mean detachment from the Party’s line and policies,” and that “an independent 
trial does not mean that trial is not subject to supervision.”131 Put in the context 
of the protestors being arrested and detained for alleged wrongful conducts 
against the State, and against the CPV, the independent trial structure serves 
more form than function. 
In addition, the Vietnamese courts use an inquisitorial system where the 
judge takes on the role of asking questions, ascertaining facts, and even “fram-
ing outcomes as to reconcile litigants’ claims with state interests[.]”132 The 
defense attorneys, therefore, play a very limited role and are usually under 
severe time constraints to prepare for trial.133 In the trial involving the arrest 
and detention of peaceful protestors, judges even “occasionally [silence] de-
fense lawyers who [are] making arguments on behalf of their clients.”134 
Moreover, the Criminal Procedure provision that provides the defendants with 
the ability to cross examine witnesses135 may often be of little use. The litiga-
tion procedure in Vietnam lacks disclosure and discovery requirements, leav-
ing the defense counsel in the dark as to “which witnesses would be called.”136 
The law also allows the court, at its discretion, to use an absent witness’s prior 
statements that were given to the investigating authorities.137 Unlike in the 
United States, cross-examination is merely a privilege and not a constitutional 
right that is guaranteed in Vietnamese courts.138 This practice raises various 
concerns regarding the authenticity of evidence and whether the statement 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 15. 
 131 Tran, supra note 109. 
 132 Bui, supra note 58, at 331. 
 133 See supra text accompanying note 4; see also HRW Mother Mushroom, supra note 
45 (raising concern that the defense lawyer was disbarred four days before the trial); Joshua 
Lipes, Vietnam Upholds Decade-Long Jail Term for Activist Blogger Mother Mushroom, 
RADIO FREE ASIA (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/appeal-1130 
2017162232.html (noting that the defendant’s mother and supporters were all refused entry 
to the courtroom). 
 134 U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 12. 
 135 C. CRIM. PRO., ch. XX, art. 211, cl. 2. 
 136 U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 12. 
 137 C. CRIM. PRO., ch. XVIII, art. 192. 
 138 Compare C. CRIM. PRO., ch. XX, art. 211, cl. 2 (“[D]efense counsels . . . may further 
ask the witnesses.”) (emphasis added), with U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”) (emphasis added). 
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should be admissible; this Note, however, does not dive deeper into these is-
sues. 
There are yet many other factors about the court that weigh heavily against 
the detainees in these cases. The low starting salary, coupled with the struc-
tured increase based on time spent in office,139 renders judges susceptible to 
corruption. As an author has pointed out, it is common for “those involved in 
litigation to approach the court to explain the details of their case before it is 
actually heard.”140 It is also “not unusual for judges to be offered a fee linked 
to the outcome of a particular case.”141 These cases in which protestors have 
been arrested and detained under Article 79 or 88 certainly fall squarely within 
this category. In the eyes of the public, the court acts as “an arbiter of conten-
tious issues that is alert to the public’s attitude.”142 Thus, the supervision under 
which courts normally operate becomes scrutiny from the CPV, and the 
Party’s influence becomes even more pronounced. The state-controlled press 
can “bring substantial pressure on the courts to decide cases in a particular 
way.”143 
A scholar has observed that many people believe “the [mere] fact that a 
court decides to hear a case is in itself an expression of its consent to the views 
of the procuracy, and that it is a foregone conclusion that the case constitutes 
a crime.”144 In the rare circumstances that the verdict is not what the govern-
ment has expected, presumably because it is not harsh enough,145 the procu-
racies reserve the right to protest against such judgments,146 undoubtedly rais-
ing some concerns regarding judicial independence. The defendants also have 
the constitutionally guaranteed ability to appeal,147 but such appeals are “done 
on the record without argument.”148 In the two-tier system in Vietnam, if the 
appellate court affirms the lower court’s ruling, the verdict takes effect imme-
diately,149 although the dissatisfied defendant can petition for review to the 
Judges’ Council of the Supreme People’s Court (Uy Ban Tham Phan Toa An 
 
 139 Nicholson, Politics of Appointment, supra note 117, at 23, 25. 
 140 Nicholson, supra note 106, at 48–49. 
 141 Id. at 48. 
 142 Id. at 46. 
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 144 Vu Cong Giao & Joel Ng, The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, RULE OF LAW FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ASEAN REGION: A BASE-LINE STUDY, HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR. 
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 146 C. CRIM. PRO., ch. XXIII, art. 232. 
 147 Id. at art. 231; see also HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. 
VIII, art. 103, cl. 6. 
 148 Quinn, supra note 24, at 229. 
 149 Joshua Lipes, Vietnam Appeals Court Upholds Jail Terms For Two Dissidents, RADIO 
FREE ASIA (May 26, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/appeal-0526201713 
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Nhan Dan Cap Cao).150 The Council only grants petitions on a discretionary 
basis.151 As expected, it is unlikely that the Council will review decisions in-
volving charges under the national security umbrella, and even in the hypo-
thetical scenario that it does, rulings on such sensitive matters are “extremely 
difficult to overturn.”152 In other words, sentences by the trial court imposed 
upon a peaceful protestor who has been charged under Article 79 or 88 are, in 
virtually all cases, the final verdict. 
To most people in any jurisdiction, navigating the legal maze is often an 
already complicated task. For a peaceful protestor in Vietnam who has been 
arrested and detained, that task is generally an impossible mission. The police 
enjoy wide discretion afforded by the vague language used in the law to justify 
their arbitrary arrests of the protestors under the broad national security 
charges. Once the arrest has been made, the government enjoys a vast selec-
tion of loopholes and bureaucratic tactics to exploit, including isolating the 
detainees for extended periods of time and delaying access to counsel. Throw 
into this mix an ineffective court system that is heavily influenced by poli-
tics,153 judges and people’s jurors who are carefully handpicked by the State’s 
head political party, rulings that can be swayed and are not decided on proper 
bases, and the detained protestors face a perfect storm. 
IV. THE GLOBAL IMPACT AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 
In isolation, the current law and the Vietnamese government’s treatment 
of peaceful protestors seem to have affected only the Vietnamese people. 
However, in this era of globalization, all nations are connected to, and their 
actions have effects on, each other, and Vietnam is no exception. 
The first and perhaps most direct scenario arises when a citizen of a dif-
ferent country gets involved in peaceful protesting in Vietnam. For instance, 
William Nguyen, an American citizen from Houston, Texas, was arrested and 
held in jail for “disturbing the peace” when he participated in a demonstration 
against an economic zone proposal that would promote Chinese 
 
 150 Quinn, supra note 24, at 229, 230. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Lipes, supra note 149 (noting that no cases related to national security have ever been 
reviewed by the Supreme Court after the appellate courts upheld the initial ruling). 
 153 Some scholars have adopted a so-called “instrumentalist” view of the Vietnamese le-
gal system, which acknowledges the existence of a body of law but argues that the socialist 
states “have promulgated law as a tool for political control.” Bui Ngoc Son, The Law of 
China and Vietnam in Comparative Law, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 135, 139 (2017). Regard-
ing the legal system in Vietnam, Professor Nicholson has commented that the Vietnamese 
court is “concurrently a legal and political institution,” bound by law but must resolve is-
sues under the party-state’s influence. Id. at 179. 
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investments.154 Vietnam has since deported Nguyen,155 but not before airing 
a videoclip of his admission to a violation of Vietnamese laws and his promise 
not to “join any anti-state activities anymore.”156 Another American citizen, 
Michael Nguyen, was detained in July 2018 pending investigation of charges 
of “activity against the People’s government” without the ability to see family 
or lawyers.157 It is entirely possible that the government did not know Michael 
was a foreigner, as officials “frequently detained human rights activists upon 
their return from overseas trips.”158 While it is problematic for peaceful pro-
testors to be arbitrarily arrested, American citizen protestors, unlike their Vi-
etnamese counterparts, still have a remedy at their disposal—reliance on the 
U.S. government to take actions.159 
The second scenario manifests itself in the form of international responses. 
In 1977, Vietnam became a member state of the United Nations.160 The inter-
national organization drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) in 1948, which set out “fundamental human rights to be universally 
protected.”161 Furthermore, in 1982, Vietnam acceded to the International 
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been jailed in Vietnam for anti-state conduct). 
 160 Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2019). 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),162 a multilateral treaty mon-
itored by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) which 
commits its state parties to fifty-three articles regarding human rights.163 In 
2014, Vietnam appeared before the United Nations Universal Periodic Re-
view (UPR) and accepted 182 out of 227 recommendations from UN member 
countries.164 The government has done little to honor its commitment—in 
some cases, such as detaining dissident journalists, it has made the situation 
even worse.165 
Since all UN members have “pledged themselves to achieve . . . the pro-
motion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms,”166 acts or conducts by any nation which deviate from that 
standard understandably trigger reactions from the UNHRC. It is important to 
note that these treaties and standards, without a formal enforcement authority, 
are more or less “soft law mechanisms.”167 What this means is that a desig-
nated global institution, here the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention (WGAD), normally reviews a case, evaluates whether it is con-
sistent with the norms articulated in UDHR and ICCPR, and then “advocates 
to encourage governments to implement its [non-binding] recommenda-
tion.”168 
As an illustration, in 2003, Dr. Nguyen Dan Que was arrested after sending 
out a statement via email criticizing the government’s claim to guarantee free-
dom of information and at the same time endorsing the “Freedom of Infor-
mation in Vietnam Act” introduced in the U.S.169 He was charged with pos-
session and distribution of materials which contained “anti-Vietnam 
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information” in violation of Article 80 of the Penal Code, potentially facing a 
long prison sentence or even death.170 Freedom Now, a non-profit, non-gov-
ernmental advocacy organization, petitioned to the WGAD’s “Urgent Action” 
procedure.171 The Working Group, in its opinion in September 2004, found 
that Dr. Que’s actions were a valid exercise of freedom of opinion and expres-
sion, which is recognized in both article 19 of UDHR and article 19 of 
ICCPR,172 “to which Viet Nam is a party.”173 Therefore, deeming such an ar-
rest arbitrary and in contravention with the international norms and principles, 
the Working Group proposed that Vietnam take actions to comply with the 
two agreements.174 
A fascinating development in this case was the significant advocacy and 
involvement from the international community. Before the opinion of the 
WGAD, twelve Nobel Laureates sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Vietnam 
urging the release of Dr. Que,175 followed by his brother’s article “Freedom 
For Vietnam, Freedom For My Brother,” describing the circumstances of the 
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Khai, Prime Minister of Vietnam (Sept. 22, 2003) (on file with Freedom Now), http://www. 
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arrest,176 and another letter from fifteen RFK Human Rights Award Laureates 
petitioning for his release to the Prime Minister and the President of Vi-
etnam.177 Notwithstanding the inaction from the government after the WGAD 
opinion, U.S. lawmakers joined in the efforts with a letter from forty-two Con-
gress members and a second letter from twelve Senators, both criticizing the 
government’s treatment of Dr. Que and emphasizing the “unnecessary irritant 
in U.S.-Vietnam relations” caused by his detention.178 Against the continued 
silence, nine human rights organizations, including Freedom Now and Am-
nesty International, wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions (and enclosed copies to several members of the Vietnamese govern-
ment), requesting his intervention “to ensure Vietnam complies with all 
relevant human rights instruments preventing arbitrary detention.”179 Shortly 
afterward, Dr. Que was released from prison, albeit under constant police 
watch.180 The WGAD opinion, along with tremendous efforts from a foreign 
government (here, the United States) and various international organizations, 
made the release of Dr. Que possible. 
Vietnam’s lack of true freedom of speech protection has negatively im-
pacted not only the human rights of its citizens, but also its international econ-
omy. The adoption of the 1992 constitution has enabled Vietnam’s transition 
to an open-market economy and allowed for a more progressive relation with 
the rest of the world.181 The development was further strengthened by the bi-
lateral trade agreement with the United States in 2001, which was the “last 
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step in a long reconciliation” between the two countries,182 and accession to 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2007.183 But how does the mis-
treatment of some individuals have a cross-borders effect? “Progress in de-
velopment and on human rights goes hand in hand,”184 and the international 
response to continued mistreatment demonstrates the cross-border effect. For-
eign governments consider the issue of human rights violations during trans-
actions and negotiations with other countries. For example, the EU-Vietnam 
Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) was scheduled to be ratified in 2018, which 
would drastically boost Vietnam’s economy by, among other ways, eliminat-
ing tariffs for exports to Europe.185 However, thirty-two members of the Eu-
ropean Parliament decided to delay finalizing the deal due to “grave concerns” 
and “serious doubts about the country’s stated commitment to respect human 
rights.”186 Specifically, in their letter sent to the EU’s Trade Commissioner 
Cecilia Malmstrom and High Representative Federica Mogherini, the mem-
bers suggested that the EU should set out certain “human rights benchmarks” 
for Vietnam to meet “before the EVFTA is submitted to Parliament for ap-
proval.”187 These benchmarks include the repeal of certain articles to conform 
with the ICCPR, release of peaceful protestors, and revisions of the law on 
cyber security, among others.188 Similarly, human rights groups have also 
called on Australia to adamantly pursue these issues.189 Continuing from the 
2017 Australia-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue where there were robust dis-
cussions on “a wide range of human rights issues,”190 in 2018, Australia em-
phasized concerns regarding “ongoing restrictions on civil and political 
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rights” and “[the] arrest and detention of human rights activists,” following 
the signing of the Strategic Partnership with Vietnam.191 Using the economic 
carrot-and-stick to negotiate improvements on human rights is not a new tac-
tic. It was, in fact, used effectively when Vietnam sought to join the WTO in 
2007.192 
On the flip side, changes in international economic policy and social poli-
tics may undermine improvements or efforts on activism in Vietnam. For in-
stance, one of President Trump’s first acts in office was to withdraw from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).193 The rationale for the decision was that the 
treaty was “hurt[ing] American manufacturing,” and that it “would be a bad 
deal for American businesses, workers and taxpayers.”194 While there are cer-
tainly financial consequences stemming from this event, withdrawal by the 
United States has freed the Vietnamese government from “conditions imposed 
by the Obama administration to join the trade pact.”195 Moreover, it has also 
reversed the dynamic of social movement that was growing in Vietnam, re-
sulting instead in a large oppressive crackdown on activists and peaceful pro-
testors.196 Vietnam’s ascension to the top five of the world’s biggest prisons 
for journalists in 2017197 could be partially attributed to President Trump’s 
open condemnation of the news media,198 which had already had a “trickle-
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down consequence[] for state and local journalists,”199 and very likely encour-
aged conservative foreign governments to justify their arrests and detention 
of dissidents.200 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The release of Dr. Que raises a hypothetical question, whether this could 
be the remedy for the arrested and detained protestors. Since none of the cur-
rently available approaches in Vietnam’s legal system prove feasible, perhaps 
gathering international aids is a feasible solution. This idea, however, is far 
removed from reality for two reasons. First, the WGAD could only provide 
non-binding recommendations in the form of opinions to the government and 
does not have authority to impose sanctions for violations of UDHR or 
ICCPR.201 While its contribution to Dr. Que’s release was in no way trivial, a 
significant force that drove the decision was the collective pressure on Viet-
namese government from the international community whose reaction was 
likely invoked in the first place thanks to Dr. Que’s reputation as “one of Vi-
etnam’s most renowned democracy activists.”202 In fact, he had received mul-
tiple human rights awards, including the Raoul Wallenberg Award and the 
RFK Human Rights Award,203 the latter of which positioned him in the circle 
of fellow RFK laureates. Put another way, his achievements have created a 
unique reputation and exposure for him, one that could influence worldwide 
movement. That is not the case for most detained protestors who are just eve-
ryday people without much connection or recognition, voicing their dissents 
over injustice. Second, from a policy perspective, this approach is inefficient 
and cumbersome, as it requires a large number of resources. As the case 
demonstrated, in addition to the investigation by Freedom Now and WGAD, 
twenty-seven laureates, more than fifty U.S. officials, and nine organizations 
were involved in the course of one year.204 Dr. Que’s release was certainly 
more the exception than the rule. 
While international forces have proven to be effective in liberating de-
tained peaceful protestors, such an approach cannot be relied on sustainably 
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for another reason: Vietnam and its citizens have no control over what other 
countries can and will do. Moreover, after the government acquiesces to dip-
lomatic pressure and permits the releases, the protestors are often “exiled” and 
have to seek refuge in a Western country.205 That choice, however, is not fa-
vored by someone who wants to stay and exact change in Vietnam,206 and 
furthermore, a legal citizen should not have to pick between imprisonment or 
asylum merely for exercising a constitutional right. Thus, some fundamental 
changes in domestic law and policies are necessary. 
The first proposal is an amendment to the right to counsel. Article 31 of 
the Constitution provides that any person “who has been arrested, held in cus-
tody, [or] prosecuted . . . has the right to self-defend or to seek the assistance 
of defense from lawyers[.]”207 Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Code ap-
plies to persons held in custody and similarly grants them the right to “defend 
by themselves or ask other persons to defend them.”208 What is critically miss-
ing from both of these provisions is the timing of access to counsel. The nor-
mal practice in Vietnam following an arrest by the police is temporary deten-
tion pending an investigation,209 during which time the right to counsel is not 
enforceable. This practice is in compliance with the law in Vietnam, and in 
fact, is not exclusive to Vietnam. For example, in the U.S., where the right to 
counsel is embedded in the Sixth Amendment,210 the Supreme Court has held 
that a defendant only gains this right “at or after the time that judicial proceed-
ings have been initiated against him, ‘whether by way of formal charge, pre-
liminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’”211 In Moran v. 
Burbine, the Supreme Court further clarified that the Sixth Amendment be-
came effective “only when the government’s role shifts from investigation to 
accusation” because “it is only then that the assistance of one versed in the 
‘intricacies . . . of law’ is needed.”212 Although following the same approach, 
it is less problematic in the U.S. than in Vietnam. The police in the United 
States risk facing sanctions as well as a multitude of torts claims from an 
American citizen who is detained unreasonably or for an unreasonable period 
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of time without charges.213 As discussed above, this form of remedy is effec-
tively not available for a Vietnamese detainee in Vietnam.214 Therefore, the 
legislature should adopt an amendment enforcing the right to counsel after a 
specified threshold of time in detention, regardless of whether the investiga-
tion has concluded or the nature of the charges. This proposal will ensure that 
the defense counsel has sufficient time to prepare the case, and at the very 
least, prevent extended incommunicado detention which has been all too prev-
alent. 
The second proposal is the establishment of an independent oversight 
agency. A perpetually lurking problem in these arrests is the wide discretion 
that the police have in enforcing the law and the lack of paper trails and ac-
countability. Local and county governments could impose a procedure man-
dating details of each arrest and investigation, which would later be subject to 
review by an independent oversight agency. While the People’s Prosecutor is 
the agency designed to limit the power of the government and review the le-
gality of its action,215 this function is not effective in the case of detained 
peaceful protestors due to vague statutory language and likely influence from 
the Party, as analyzed elsewhere in the Note. An independent oversight 
agency could assume the responsibilities of reviewing the arrest reports made 
by the police, assessing the situations of the case, assigning counsel as neces-
sary, and holding the government accountable in cases of abusing its power. 
The selection step for the agency is vital. In order to be effective and inde-
pendent, the members of the agency must be democratically elected and free 
from influence from the CPV, unlike the selection of jurors.216 The election 
could be held with all candidates who are not members of the CPV and whose 
backgrounds are clearly established for lay people to consider in voting. This 
proposal certainly faces stiff resistance since the government will be reluctant 
to grant power to an agency without any CPV members. 
The third proposal involves a fundamental change in the appointment and 
election of judges. Since the appointment process occurs every five years in 
the same cycle as the National Assembly, judges are often under pressure to 
lobby for their reappointment217 as well as to decide some cases in certain 
ways to avoid not being appointed at the end of their terms.218 Legislation that 
amends the current law to extend the apportionment term for qualified judges 
may, in the short run, alleviate this pressure. Vietnam could also adopt 
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separate appointment and election processes for different levels of judges—
in particular, judges for the Supreme People’s Court enjoy lifetime tenure 
while judges at lower courts are still subject to reelection process. This treat-
ment is similar to the way Supreme Court justices are treated in the United 
States.219 The rationale for this proposal is that, by completely eliminating the 
need to seek approval for reelection, judges at the highest level can inde-
pendently decide cases according to the law without outside influence and can 
effectively provide guidance for judges in lower courts. On the other hand, 
this proposal is still susceptible to the CPV’s influence of the appointment 
process and may allow the Party state to have a lifetime control in the judicial 
system. There is currently no fix to the situation, as even in the U.S. model a 
political party circumvented the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice to 
wait for an appointee that fit the party’s needs better.220 
On the international front, other nations could be part of the solution by 
delaying economic treaties and partnerships with Vietnam until human rights 
protection and remedies are guaranteed. As discussed above, this proposal has 
achieved some success. Another possible approach could be the revocation of 
Vietnam’s membership in the United Nations if the Vietnamese government 
does not take action to abide by the ICCPR standards for human rights, which 
threatens to take away Vietnam’s access to the United Nations’ aid and assis-
tance. This proposal may require the United Nations to apply such disciplines 
uniformly to all of its members, thus risking resistance from other nations with 
situations similar to Vietnam. However, the rapid change in the global envi-
ronment and the increasing diplomatic demands for human rights from the 
international community may be effective in driving these changes forward. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The history of Vietnam is the history of people fighting for freedom. The 
establishment of the CPV serves as a reminder of that history and that the 
government will do anything to preserve the leadership of the Party. To pre-
vent any threat that may undermine the CPV’s power or possibly overthrow 
the sovereign, regardless of how remotely plausible that threat may be, the 
government has taken extreme measures, including censoring the media and 
arbitrarily arresting and detaining peaceful protestors. Such measures have a 
negative impact on the lives of Vietnamese citizens as well as other aspects 
of the country and have invoked international responses. In order for Vietnam 
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to move forward and develop relations with other countries, it must take hu-
man rights issues, particularly freedom of speech, seriously. The adoption of 
the first domestic proposal could provide a safeguarding remedy for the pro-
testors who are already detained. The second domestic proposal would likely 
face resistance or may even prove futile, but the continued international pres-
sure will help push it forward. Other nations could play a vital role in effecting 
these changes by employing a more decisive approach in economic negotia-
tions with Vietnam, conditioning agreements on improvements in human 
rights treatment and protection. Freedom of speech is a fundamental right, and 
no other activists should have to face long-term imprisonment for exercising 
that right like Le Dinh Luong. 
 
